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Abstract
This paper aims at presenting a new countermeasure against Side-Channel Anal-
ysis (SCA) attacks, whose implementation is based on a hardware-software co-
design. The hardware architecture consists of a microprocessor, which executes
the algorithm using a false key, and a coprocessor that performs several opera-
tions that are necessary to retrieve the original text that was encrypted with the
real key. The coprocessor hardly affects the power consumption of the device,
so that any classical attack based on such power consumption would reveal a
false key. Additionally, as the operations carried out by the coprocessor are
performed in parallel with the microprocessor, the execution time devoted for
encrypting a specific text is not affected by the proposed countermeasure. In
order to verify the correctness of our proposal, the system was implemented on
a Virtex 5 FPGA. Different SCA attacks were performed on several functions
of AES algorithm. Experimental results show in all cases that the system is
effectively protected by revealing a false encryption key.
Keywords: Countermeasure, Side-Channel Analysis, AES algorithm and
Hardware-software Co-design
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1. Introduction
Since Kocher et al. [1], in the late 1990s, demonstrated the vulnerabilities
of cryptographic devices, Side Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks have become
the most significant threat related to the security of cryptographic algorithms.
These attacks base their success on analyzing the leakage information that is5
mainly observable through the power consumption or the electromagnetic radi-
ation (EM) emitted by a hardware device. The attack is feasible because either
of these two quantities is related to the data being processed by the device,
which depends on the value of the cryptographic key.
Once such weakness was revealed, part of the scientific community oriented10
their efforts in proposing countermeasures that provide resistance against SCA
attacks. Although with some differences, almost all proposed solutions attempt
to design systems in which the power consumption (or the EM) is independent
of the data that they process. This objective is achieved either by providing
systems featured with random power consumption or building devices in which15
such power is constant in each clock cycle. The latter approach, known as hid-
ing, has usually been implemented at cell level based on the Dual-Rail Precharge
(DRP) logic style. This style is tailored with signals represented by two com-
plementary wires, in such a way that in every clock cycle only one switch per
cycle is produced. Thus, during the pre-charge phase, both the direct and com-20
plementary wires are charged,whereas in the evaluation phase only one of them
is discharged. Among the more significant proposals of this logic style can be
found Sense Amplifier Based Logic (SABL) [2] and Wave Dynamic Differential
Logic (WDDL) [3]. However, the main drawback of such DRP logic styles is
that their success depends on the perfect balancing between the capacitive loads25
related to the complementary wires that form the overall circuit. This require-
ment implies including some constraints on the placement and routing steps.
In contrast, the former approach, known as masking, has been implemented
at both algorithm and cell levels. At cell level, the most relevant proposals
are Random Switching Logic (RSL) [4], Dual Random Switching Logic (DRSL)30
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[5] and Masked Dual-Rail Precharge Logic (MDPL) [6]. Masking Boolean ap-
proaches base their resistance against SCA attacks on concealing, by means of
an exclusive OR operator, all intermediate values v with a random mask m. The
masked values vm = (v⊕m), which are actually being processed into the hard-
ware device, are statistically independent with respect to v, so that the power35
consumption and the cryptographic key are completely uncorrelated. Thus,
these logic styles are not affected by the imbalance existing between the routing
capacitances of complementary wires. Furthermore, approaches based on hid-
ing (i.e., SABL and WDDL) could be implemented in a smaller area than the
one needed by the masked logic styles (i.e., MPDL, RSL, DRSL). Additionally,40
SABL, RSL and DRSL require designing specific cells for their implementation,
whereas WDDL or MDPL allow designing such secure logic based on existing
standard cells.
Moreover, it has been shown that in general the security of cell level im-
plementations could be compromised due to the effect of the inter-wire capaci-45
tances [7] or the so-called early propagation effect [8][9]. As these vulnerabilities
became known, the previous proposals were updated, including new measures
that make systems more secure against most of these harmful effects. For in-
stance, the original MDPL, which inherently is a glitch-free logic style based on
majority-gates, was modified to support the early propagation effect (iMDPL)50
[10]. Other examples of improved DPR styles can be found in [11] and [12].
More recently, a new countermeasure termed SecLib has been proposed [13].
The early evaluation is prevented by designing specific cells based on two stages
that avoid such effect. However, as stated by the authors, it also increases the
cost in terms of area, delay and power consumption.55
Masking is a countermeasure that can be also implemented at algorithm
level. In [14], the authors proposed an implementation of the AES encryption
algorithm using six independent masks. The algorithm was solved on an 8-
bit microcontroller leading to an execution time twice that compared with the
unmasked version. There are also some proposals for implementing hiding coun-60
termeasures on software. These approaches aim at introducing temporal jitter
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in the sequence of operations performed by the microprocessor. This way, the
instant at which an effective attack might be produced is distributed over time
following an unknown probability distribution function (misalignment of power
traces). Some examples of these software countermeasures consist of introducing65
dummy cycles [15] or a random variation on the execution orders [16].
Other different publications aim at introducing noise to reduce the correla-
tion between the processed data and the cryptographic key. Following this idea
an interesting approach was proposed in [17], in which a noise generator cor-
related with the data that is being processed is included. However, the attack70
is only effective when the target is the function correlated with the introduced
power noise. Additionally, the revealed key is not always the same and it de-
pends on the number of traces captured and used to perform the attack.
As mentioned above, SCA attacks based their success on exploiting the ex-
isting dependence between the processed data and the power consumption (or75
EM). As data depend on the cryptographic key, from a statistical point of view
it means that there exists a correlation between such a key and the consumed
power. Theoretically, only the correct key is able to produce a correlation with
a significant value, whereas the rest of the keys would generate a value close to
zero. Countermeasures based on hiding or masking try to eliminate this corre-80
lation, in such a way that any SCA attack, performed on any possible key, does
not produce any relevant result that could be distinguished among all others.
In other words, all correlations between power consumption and guessed keys
are equally likely and tend to zero.
The countermeasure proposed in this paper is completely different when85
compared with previous approaches. The mechanism for protecting the system
consists in revealing a false key when a SCA attack is performed. This false
key (or fake key) produces the highest correlation coefficient between the data
processed and the power consumed by the hardware device. Thus, from the
perspective of an attacker, the system behaves as an unprotected implementa-90
tion that conceals the true key by producing a false positive. Note that, such
implementation should be performed affecting as little as possible the power
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consumption trace (in amplitude and time) when compared with the original
non-protected system.
Although the proposed countermeasure, termed faking, could be entirely im-95
plemented in software, the penalty on the execution time would be quite signifi-
cant. In fact, including all additional calculations needed to conceal the real key,
such execution time is almost doubled when compared with the non-protected
version. Instead, the implementation presented in this paper is based on a hard-
ware/software co-design. The system consists of a microprocessor which solves100
via software the classical Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 128-bit cryp-
tographic algorithm, and a coprocessor specifically designed for implementing
the proposed countermeasure. The proposed architecture is intended for appli-
cations in which the main task performed by the microprocessor is to solve a
specific processing from which a critical information is obtained. The encryption105
is necessary for storing this confidential data in an external device or for sending
such information through a non-secure channel. For instance, the microproces-
sor could be used for analyzing a fingerprint image from which a confidential
biometric feature is obtained and should be stored in an external memory. Al-
though is out the scope of this paper, in applications where the encryption is110
the main task that should be performed, a complete hardware-implementation
would be more suitable and faster. Regardless of the implementation chosen,
hardware, hardware-software or pure software, the level of security for all of
them is identical and only their features in terms of area and speed are differ-
ent.115
This paper is organized into five sections. Section II presents the funda-
mentals of the proposed countermeasure. The aim of Section III is to describe
the internal architecture of the coprocessor and its main features. Section IV
presents the experimental results. Finally, section V presents the conclusions
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Figure 1: Basic structure of the Advanced Encryption Standard algorithm AES 128-bit
2. Fundamentals120
2.1. Introduction
The structure of the AES 128-bit encryption algorithm is represented in
Fig:1 As the figure shows, the algorithm consists of four operations that are per-
formed on a matrix of 16 bytes, termed state, in different rounds: AddRoundKey
(exclusive-OR), SubBytes, ShiftRows and Mixcolumns. A general description125
about the principles of this cipher, including such four operations, can be found
in [18] [19].
Although in the proposal presented by Kocher the cryptographic key was
found using the differential-of-means method, currently the most extended sta-
tistical method employed for this purpose is based on correlation [14]. This130
method consists of the following steps:
a) The encryption algorithm is executed M times using a set of M different plain
texts. For each one, a current trace is captured and stored for its subsequent
processing.
b) It is quite usual to choose as points to be attacked (target) the output of135
one of the four operations (inputs of the following points) involved in the
AES algorithm, since their result (state) is normally written in a memory or
register, which creates a distinguishable point at the captured power trace.
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c) A theoretical power model, which represents the consumption of the overall
set of CMOS cells that form the circuit, should be chosen. Such a theoretical
model is normally based on the Hamming distance (HD) or the Hamming
weight (HW), that represents the value of a set of bits v(tk) related to the
point to be attacked. Note that, if an intermediate value at instant (tk−1) is
v(tk−1), then
HD(v(tk)) = HW (v(tk−1)⊕ v(tk)) (1)
Note that, the choice of any of the four operations as target of the attack
facilitates the calculation of the value related to the theoretical model of140
power consumption
d) As the value of such a model depends on the cryptographic key, N values
for N possible guessed keys should be calculated, assuming that the plain
text (or the cipher text) is known by the attacker. Usually, to make the
attack feasible, only a specific byte of an intermediate value at instant tk is145
attacked, which reduces the value of N to 256 possibilities.
e) Each of these N particularized power models is correlated with all the M cap-
tured current traces at instant tk. A number of NxM correlation coefficients
are obtained. The calculation of such correlation is based on the Pearson’s
coefficient [14].150
f) The highest correlation corresponds to the true encryption key.
2.2. Basis of the faking countermeasure
The underlying idea behind the proposed faking countermeasure is to carry
out the encrypting process using a fake key KeyFAKE , which is obtained by
XORing the real one KeyREAL with a mask KeyMASK in the following way
KeyFAKE = KeyREAL ⊕KeyMASK (2)
Note that, in a general case all keys included in (2) consist of 16 different
bytes each one, and they can be represented by a matrix of 4x4 bytes. The
basic structure of the protected system is presented in Fig:2. The operations155
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Figure 2: Structure for the implementation of the faking countermeasure applied on the
Advanced Encryption Standard algorithm AES 128-bit.
performed during each round on the state matrix (AddRoundKey, SubBytes,
ShiftRows and MixColumns) are processed by using the KeyFAKE , so that as
the system does not have any additional countermeasure any SCA attack would
reveal the false key.
If no additional actions are performed, the cipher text would be encrypted160
with KeyFAKE rather than the real key. Thus, at the end of each round the
coprocessor is in charge of making the inverse process in order to retrieve the
proper state matrix encrypted with KeyREAL. Such a process is performed in
two steps, SBoxTrans and MixCol, in order to break up the operations per-
formed with KeyFAKE by SubBytes and MixColumns, respectively. The effect165
of ShiftRows is not included in the coprocessor, since its output is based on a
simple permutation. The block MixCol behaves in an identical manner to the
MixColumns operation defined by the standard AES algorithm. Instead, SBox-
Trans concentrates the main idea on which the faking countermeasure is based.
SubBytes is a non-linear function, derived from the multiplicative inverse over170
GF (28), that is implemented by using a substitution box SBox(b) (b=0..255)
which applies over each byte of state. Such a box could be pre-computed only
once at the beginning of the algorithm. Let be aF (i, j) (i=0..3, j=0..3) a par-
ticular byte of state at the output of Shiftrows. This byte mainly consists in a
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combination of the plain text T(i,j) and KeyFAKE(i,j) with a XOR operator175
SBox(aF (i, j)) = SBox(T (i, j)⊕KeyFAKE(i, j)) (3)
Thus, a simple way of recovering the original byte aR(i, j) encrypted with
KeyREAL (aR(i, j) = T (i, j)⊕KeyREAL(i, j)) at the output of SubBytes would
be by defining SBoxTrans as follows
SBoxTrans(aF (i, j)) = SBox(aF (i, j))⊕SBox(aF (i, j)⊕KeyMASK(i, j)) (4)
Using (2) and the algebraic properties of the XOR operator, (4) becomes:
SBox(aF (i, j)) = SBoxTrans(aF (i, j))⊕ SBox(aR(i, j)) (5)
so that computing (4) and (5) with an exclusive-OR, SBox(aR(i, j)) is directly
obtained. In fact such an operation, termed remasking, is performed at the end
of each round by computing the output of MixColumns and MixCol (see Fig:2).
It is noteworthy that SBoxTrans can be implemented as a simple lookup table,
which can be pre-computed like the original SBox(). It is important to point180
out that there will be a clear vulnerability if the same byte KeyMASK(i, j) is
used to build the matrix KeyMASK . As KeyFAKE could be revealed through
a SCA attack, and since the cipher text is known by the attacker, a simple
brute force attack consisting in 256 guessed values (the 256 possible values that
could take the byte KeyMASK(i, j) (i=0..3, j=0..3)) would be enough to reveal185
KeyREAL. Hence, there will be a trade-off between the time needed to calculate
this table and the level of security, which are both dependent on the number of
different bytes KeyMASK(i, j) chosen to form the matrix KeyMASK . Let be I
such a number, being 1 ≤ I ≤ 16. Then, as byte aF (i, j) can take 256 different
values, the size of the table used to build SBoxTrans will be Ix256 elements190
and its implementation, in the worst case, would be possible using a memory
of 4Kbytes. In practice, it is advisable to choose the maximum value for I, in
order to obtain the same fortress as the original AES algorithm (experimental
results were obtained using a KeyMASK which consists of 16 different bytes).
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2.3. Weakness of faking and use of masking techniques195
When implementing the coprocessor, it is important to take into account
some weaknesses that are usually related to hardware implementations.
Devices protected by Boolean masking approaches, which leak the Hamming
distance, could not be completely secure if internal operations are not performed
carefully. Indeed, taking into account (1), a situation of risk occurs when two
intermediate values of vm = (v ⊕ m), concealed with the same mask m, are
written over a bus or register in two consecutive instants of time k-1 and k,
respectively, since
HD(vm(tk)) = HW (vm(tk−1)⊕ vm(tk)) = HW (v(tk−1)⊕ v(tk)) (6)
In devices that leak the Hamming weight distance, a vulnerability is pro-
duced when two intermediate masked values um and vm are operated by an
exclusive-OR operator sm = um ⊕ vm
HW (sm = um ⊕ vm) = HW (u⊕ v) = HW (s) (7)
A similar idea is behind the so-called second-order attacks [20]. Let um and vm
be two intermediate masked values, which occur at different nodes of the circuit
in Fig:1, and at different instants of time t1 and t2, respectively. These attacks200
consist of processing both intermediate masked values with an exclusive-OR
operator, in order to create a situation like that described in (7). The result of
this processing is used as a model of power consumption.This model is correlated
with a combination, based on one of the functions proposed in [14] or [20], of
the current traces captured in such intermediate masked values.205
Moreover, if no additional measures of protection are taken, there are several
points in the structure presented in Fig:2, that are susceptible to being attacked
due to some of the following vulnerabilities:
• Since KeyFAKE is known, if the attacker is able to determine KeyMASK ,
then KeyREAL would be obtained by simply applying (2). Note that, the
output of SBoxTrans in (4) could be attacked by a first order SCA and,
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hence, KeyMASK could be revealed. It is noteworthy that SBoxTrans
applies over each of the 16 bytes (i,j) (i=0..3, j=0..3) that represents the
state at the output of ShiftRows. This vulnerability could be avoided by
concealing the output of SBoxTrans(i,j)(aF (i, j)) (aF (i, j) = 0..255) with
a mask Mh(i, j)
SBoxTrans(i,j)(a(i, j)) = Sbox(a(i, j))⊕
⊕ Sbox(a(i, j)⊕KeyMASK(i, j))⊕Mh(i, j) (8)
Equation (8) is the real system implemented for SBoxTrans and it will
be used to obtain the experimental results. Such a mask is obtained by210
including a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) used to update its
value for each encrypted plain text.
• It is observed that the output of SubBytes and the output of SboxTrans
can be computed with an exclusive OR, leading to a new value SCOMB
SCOMB = Sbox(aR(i, j))⊕Mh(i, j) (9)
If such a value was not protected by the mask Mh(i, j), then the system
would be vulnerable to a second-order attack, since SCOMB reveals the
bytes aR(i, j) encrypted with KeyREAL. Note that, although second or-215
der attacks are usually performed over masked systems, here we use the
same terminology since the attack on SCOMB exploits the leakage of two
intermediate values (i.e. Sbox(aF (i, j)) and SBoxTrans(aF (i, j)).
• The function MixCol, included in the coprocessor, operates with the exclusive-
OR on several bytes of different rows obtained at the output of SBoxTrans.220
Note that these bytes are concealed with the mask Mh(i, j). As described
in (7), if the same mask m is used for all bytes(i,j) of Mh(i, j) = m, there
will be intermediate values unmasked by the effect of this operation. As
shown in Fig:2, to avoid this situation of risk, four different masks m0, m1,
m2 and m3 are used to conceal each row at the output of SBoxTrans [14].225
Therefore, Mh(i, j) will be represented by a 4x4 matrix in which the value
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of all bytes of a row n are identical and fixed by the corresponding mask
mn (n=0..3). Consequently, the rows of state at the output of the copro-
cessor will be concealed by four new masks ma, mb, mc and md, whose
values are obtained by the simple application of the MixColumns oper-230
ation on the masked matrix Mh(i, j). Then, a new 4x4 matrix Mk(i, j)
formed by such masks is created. Note that, this new matrix can be also
pre-computed before executing the encryption algorithm. Finally, it is
observed that as, the expanded key and Mk(i, j) are operated with an
exclusive-OR before AddRoundKey is activated, any SCA attack on such235
rounds would also reveal the fake key KeyFAKE .
• Additionally, as the coprocessor uses a different set of masks at the input
and output of MixCol, the possibility of performing a second-order attack
between both intermediate values is eliminated.
As will be described in the next section, these and other measures of pro-240
tection are taken into account when designing the internal architecture of the
coprocessor.
3. Architecture of the coprocessor
Some aspects related to the design of the coprocessor depend on how the
microprocessor manages the execution of instructions and the access to data245
stored in memory. Fig:3 shows a simulation that represents the processing of
a byte when the microprocessor computes the SubByte function over the par-
ticular value vm = 0x05. The microprocessor employed for this purpose is the
MicroBlaze, which is also used for obtaining the experimental results. This
microprocessor consists of five pipeline stages, so that the execution of an in-250
struction is performed five cycles after its fetch is produced. The first two rows of
Fig:3 represent both the address (m abus) and the data (sl dbus) bus connected
to the instruction memory. The calculation of SBox(0x05) is expanded from
cycle CLK 1 to cycle CLK 8. In CLK 9 a new processing over a different value
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Figure 3: Representation of the behavior of signals (buses) related to MicroBlaze when eval-
uating the function SubBytes.
is started. The pre-computed table related to SBox is stored at base address255
0x01FE0. The last three rows represent the behavior of buses connected to data
memory: address (lmb abus), read (lmb readbus) and write (lmb writebus). The
address, in which vm is located (0x01FE5 = 0x01FE0 + 0x05 ), is placed on the
lmb abus line at cycle CLK 6, according to the specific pipeline structure of the
microprocessor. Note that, in such a cycle the lmb writebus is also charged with260
vm, which is the output of function ShiftRows. Such a byte is processed by the
SubBytes function providing as result the value um = 0x6B, which is placed in
bus lmb writebus during several clock cycles. Thus, the time interval that covers
from cycle CLK 6 to cycle CLK 13 is the period in which the microprocessor
is vulnerable to an SCA attack, since during this period of time lmb writebus265
contains either the output of functions ShiftRows or SubBytes. Particularly, in
cycle CLK 9 the leakage of information can be utilized to evaluate the Ham-
ming distance (HD), whereas in cycles CLK 10 to CLK 13 the actual leakage is
useful for calculating the Hamming weight distance (HW). Thus, if the idea of
the proposed countermeasure is to reveal a false key, during such time interval,270
described as unsafe area in Fig:3, the coprocessor must be disabled in order to
facilitate an SCA attack that produces the highest correlation coefficient. These
conclusions are experimentally corroborated by Fig:4, which shows the calcula-
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Figure 4: correlation coefficient based on HD (upper) and HW (lower) distances, at different
instants of time included inside the unsafe area.
tion of the correlation coefficient during all instants of time included into the
unsafe area and using the power models based on HD and HW, respectively.275
These figures were obtained by applying to each clock cycle the attack process
described in section 2.1, and representing only the value obtained for the highest
correlation coefficient related to the false key. The HD model is quite effective
in CLK 9, and it could be easily calculated since the previous (vm = 0x05, out-
put of ShiftRows) and the subsequent (um = 0x6B, output of SubBytes) values280
written in lmb writebus are known. In contrast, note that when a byte is writ-
ten on such a bus, its 24 most significant bits are pre-charged to 0 during three
clock cycles. This behavior makes the HW the most effective model for the rest
of the unsafe area. As can be seen in Fig:4 (lower trace), in accordance with the
simulation results, in cycles CLK 10 and CLK 13 the value of the correlation285
coefficient is quite significant.
The coprocessor knows the area of memory in which the SBox table is stored,
so that it could be disabled by simply monitoring the address bus lmb abus.
In Fig:3, this situation is represented by the signal Coprocessor halt, which is
activated when such memory space is addressed.290
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Figure 5: Internal architecture for SboxTrans.
The coprocessor is designed including two independent blocks for imple-
menting the operations SboxTrans and MixCol ; Fig:5 and Fig:6 represent their
internal structure.
As can be seen, SBoxTrans consists of two groups of 16 memories imple-
mented using blocks of BRAM included in the FPGA. Each of these two groups295
of memories, denoted as MEM0 and MEM1, are concealed with 2 different sets
of masks Mh(i, j) (i=0..3, j=0..3) and Mh′(i, j) ((i=0..3, j=0..3)), respectively.
Each individual memory stores the 256 pre-computed values obtained by apply-
ing (8). These two groups are included in order to facilitate the updating of
masks Mh(i, j) (or Mh′(i, j)) used to protect the output of SBoxTrans, in such300
a way that each new plaint text is encrypted using a different set of masks
Mh(i, j) or Mh′(i, j). The process for updating the value of such masks is as
follows:
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Figure 6: Internal architecture for block MixCol included in the coprocessor.
• If during the encryption of plain text Ti the output of SBoxTrans is con-
cealed with masks Mh(i, j) (included in MEM0), then in the following305
plain text Ti+1 such output will be concealed with masks Mh′(i, j) (in-
cluded in MEM1) and vice versa.
• The True Random Number Generator (TRNG), included as part of the co-
processor, creates a new set of masksMh(i, j)CREATED andMh′(i, j)CREATED
for each encrypted plain text Ti and Ti+1, respectively.310
• The created mask Mh(i, j)CREATED, and the actual values of its corre-
sponding group of memories concealed with Mh(i, j)OLD, are operated
with an exclusive-OR. Thus, the elements of such memories will be con-
cealed with a new mask Mh(i, j)NEW whose value is Mh(i, j)CREATED ⊕
Mh(i, j)OLD. The second group of memories related to Mh′(i, j) are up-315
dated in a similar way.
• The operations of creating and updating the masks are performed dur-
ing the execution of rounds 5 and 6. Note that, when such rounds are
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processed the state depends on the 128 bits of the cryptographic key, so
that performing an SCA attack is considered unpractical. This way, the320
interfering noise created when updating these masks does not affect any
potential attack performed on rounds in which the system is vulnerable
and can reveal the false key (first and last round).
On the other hand, the signal Enable t (t=0..15) is activated according to the
byte of state that is being processed. The time needed by SBoxTrans to process325
the 16 input bytes is 17 clock cycles (TCLK).
The block MixCol is implemented by multiplying each column of the output
of SboxTrans by a fixed polynomial 3x3 + x2 + x + 2 modulo x4 + 1. The
operation sum in GF (28) can be performed by a simple XOR gate, whereas the
multiplication is defined by many authors using the so-called function xtime()330
[19]. As Fig:6 shows, such a function can be implemented by including a shift-
register, a multiplexor and a XOR gate. Thus, firstly a complete 32-bit column
(j=0..3) of SboxTrans is pre-charged on a circular shift register formed by 4
synchronous 8-bit registers. Afterwards, in each of the following four clock
cycles, one element of the output column is calculated based on function xtime(),335
and such element is stored in a second set of circular shift registers. Once this
process is finished, the following column is pre-charged and the process, for
computing the rest of columns of SboxTrans, is initiated again. The coprocessor
MixCol performs all these computations in 24 · TCLK .
4. Experimental and simulation results340
4.1. Area and correlation results
In order to prove the correctness of our proposal, the complete system was
implemented on a Virtex-5 FPGA clocked at 24 MHz. Power traces were mea-
sured using a Tektronix CT-1 current probe featuring a bandwidth range of
25 kHz to 1 GHz. The current probe was connected to an Agilent DSO1024A345
oscilloscope, which captures and stores current traces using a sample rate of 2
GS/s.
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Table 1: Area and maximum clock frequency Fmax Percentage (%) against the total number
of resources in the FPGA
Subsystem LUT Flip-Flop Slices BRAM Fmax
(Lookup table) (Reg) (36Kb) (MHz)
Microblaze 1628 (5.7%) 1498 (5.2%) 641 (8.9%) 16 160.94
Coprocessor 516 (1.8%) 567 (1.9%) 253 (3.5%) 2 227.17
Rest of peripherals 920 (3.2%) 709 (2.5%) 462 (6.4%) – 180.64
Embedded System 3064 (10.7%) 3100 (10.6%) 1356 (18.8%) 18 (37.5%) 160.94
Table 2: Execution time of function AddRoundkey, ShiftRows, SubBytes and MixColumns
when solved by Microblaze at 24 MHz and including coprocessor
Function Execution time (µs)
AddRoundkey 44.75 µs (1074· TCLK)
ShiftRows + FSL Write 5.79 µs (139· TCLK)
SubBytes 26.58 µs (638· TCLK)
MixColumns + FSL Read + Remasking 48.95 µs (1175· TCLK)
Execution time for one round) 126.07 µs (3026· TCLK)
The implemented system includes a MicroBlaze microprocessor, a specific
hardware (coprocessor) that synthetizes both the SboxTrans and MixCol blocks,
and finally a set of peripherals used for debugging the application and provid-350
ing the synchronization signals needed to capture properly the current traces.
The microprocessor, the hardware and the peripherals are connected together
by means of a Processor Local Bus (PLB), although the communication be-
tween the specific hardware and the microprocessor is performed through the
Fast Simplex Link (FSL) bus. The logic resources needed for implementing355
the overall system, and the maximum frequency given by the critical path, are
represented in Table 1.
Basically, the MicroBlaze executes the AES 128-bit algorithm by encrypting
the plain text with KeyFAKE . Table 2 shows the execution time of each of the
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Figure 7: Input current when the coprocessor concentrates (no wait-state cycles were intro-
duced) its activity at the beginning of the processing of SubBytes by the microprocessor: a)
Coprocessor activated (upper trace), b) Coprocessor disabled (middle trace) and c) Difference
between upper and middle traces.
four operations for a specific round. As can be seen, the SubBytes operation is360
solved in 638 ·TCLK , whereas MixColumns is executed in 1175 ·TCLK . However,
as blocks SubTrans and MixCol are implemented in hardware, their resolution,
according to their internal structure shown in Fig:5 and Fig:6, is faster and
could be performed in 17 · TCLK and 24 · TCLK , respectively. These blocks are
activated by the microprocessor, which sends an activation signal through the365
FSL bus. In fact, as Table 2 shows, the delay related to the communication
between both systems (FSL bus write or FSL bus read) is included as part of
the operations ShiftRows (writing) and MixColumns (reading). Such processes
of writing and reading are used for transferring through the FSL bus the actual
16 bytes of state.370
Fig:7 compares the total input current consumed by the device when the
coprocessor is activated (Fig:7a) or disabled (Fig:7b). The additional power
consumption provided by its activation is concentrated on the next 51 · TCLK
(2.12 µs), which includes both the processing and the communication delays.
The difference between the power consumption in both situations, activated or375
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Figure 8: Input current when the coprocessor introduces wait-state cycles and distributes its
activity along the interval of time in which SubBytes is processed by the microprocessor: a)
Coprocessor activate (upper trace), b) Coprocessor disabled (middle trace) and c) Difference
between upper and middle traces.
disabled, is perfectively distinguishable and measurable. Such difference, shown
in Fig:7c, is higher than 5 mA (absolute value). Moreover, the energy consumed
by the coprocessor is added on the global power, so that such energy behaves
as a noise that deteriorates the correlation coefficient related to KeyFAKE . In
order to conceal such information, the coprocessor is slowed down by introduc-380
ing wait-state cycles, in such a way that its activity is distributed along the
total time needed by the microprocessor for executing the individual operation
SubBytes. This proposal is shown in Fig:8, in which it can be observed as the
coprocessor distributes the calculation of functions SubTrans and MixCol dur-
ing the 638 · TCLK (26.58 µs) employed for executing SubBytes. Thus, a total385
of 587 wait-state cycles have been introduced. Furthermore, the difference be-
tween the input current traces when the coprocessor is activated or disabled
(Fig:8.c) is nearly unnoticeable (0.5 mA), so that the correlation coefficient will
be unaffected by the addition of the faking countermeasure. In fact, the value
represented in Fig:8.c for such difference is almost constant whatever the state390
of the coprocessor is. Additionally, taking into account that the actual values
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Figure 9: correlation coefficient calculated when processing operation SubBytes by the micro-
processor for a non-protected system.
processed by the coprocessor are concealed with Mh(i, j), an SCA attack on
SBoxTrans or MixCol would be unsuccessful even in the hypothetical situation
in which its power consumption could be isolated from the rest of the system.
Fig:9 and Fig:10 show the result of an SCA attack performed during the395
execution of the operation SubBytes. Such figures compare the behavior of
the correlation coefficient when the coprocessor is disabled (Fig:9) or activated
(Fig:10) using the power model based on the HW. Note that, according to Fig:3
and 4, there are two points in which the leakage information provides a successful
result using such a model of power. Moreover, the power consumption of the400
coprocessor does not affect the calculation of the correlation, which corroborates
the benefits of distributing its activity along the time interval in which the
function SubBytes is processed.
Fig:11 and 12 show a simulation that confirms the need of protecting Sbox-
Trans with a mask Mh(i, j). The simulation represents a second-order SCA405
attack performed by combining both the output of SboxTrans and the output
of the SubBytes by processing the absolute difference of both signals [14]. Re-
sults show whether the system is vulnerable if the attack is carried out without
concealing the data, and how such vulnerability disappears when mask Mh(i, j)
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Figure 10: correlation coefficient calculated when processing operation SubBytes by the mi-
croprocessor using the faking countermeasure. The KeyFAKE is plotted in blue and the
KeyREAL in bold.
is included.410
The experiments shown in Fig:13 (non-protected) and Fig:14 (protected)
represent the evolution of the maximum correlation coefficient over an increas-
ing number of plain texts for an attack performed on function SubBytes. These
results are almost identical when the coprocessor is activated or disabled, so that
the attacker is unable to find out if the system is protected by the faking coun-415
termeasure or not. As can be seen, capturing about 25 power traces is enough
to reveal the false key. Similarly, Fig:15 shows the same attack performed on
MixColumns function which leads to identical results.
Finally, Fig:16 shows an attack based on the differential-of-means method
proposed by Kocher. Unlike the original attack, which was performed on a single420
bit, our proposal is targeted on a complete byte following a similar strategy that
introduces some modifications:
• The process is applied on each bit j included in the byte to be analyzed.
• For the specific bit j, in which the attack is initially focused, the N current
traces are separated into two groups, depending on the value that such a425
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Figure 11: Second-order attack on functions SubBytes and SboxTrans. System non-protected
by mask Mh(i, j).
Figure 12: Second-order attack on functions SubBytes and SboxTrans. System protected by
mask Mh(i, j).
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Figure 13: Experimental attack on SubBytes for a non-protected system. Evolution of the
correlation over an increasing number of plain texts.
Figure 14: Experimental attack on SubBytes for a system protected by the faking countermea-
sure. Evolution of the correlation over an increasing number of plain texts. The KeyFAKE
is plotted in blue and the KeyREAL in bold.
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Figure 15: Experimental attack on MixColumns for a system protected by the faking counter-
measure. Evolution of the correlation over an increasing number of plain texts. The KeyFAKE
is plotted in blue and the KeyREAL in bold.
bit takes on the power consumption model for a particular plain text and
a specific key Kn (n=0..255).
• For each key Kn, the average of each group is calculated and the difference
between each average is assigned to the element d(j,n) (j=0..7, n=0..255)
of a matrix D.430
• The process is repeated for all bits and keys until matrix D is completed.
• For each column n of matrix D, its average value Dn (n=0..255) is calcu-
lated. The maximum value of Dn indicates the correct key.
In order to obtain a comparison between the hardware software implementa-
tion presented in this paper and a completely software execution, several plain435
texts have been encrypted by executing the faking countermeasure using only
the microprocessor (the coprocessor is disabled). The results are shown in Ta-
ble 3 . In this case, the execution time for one round is 4847 · TCLK (about
202µs), which is almost twice when compared with the time needed by our pro-
posal shown in Table 2. Note that, the execution time of the same function440
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Figure 16: Experimental attack on SubBytes using the differential-of-means method. System
protected by the faking countermeasure. The KeyFAKE is plotted in blue and the KeyREAL
in bold.
performed by the microprocessor in both experiments shows some slight differ-
ences depending on whether the coprocessor is or not activated. For instance,
in the complete software implementation the function MixColumns is used for
both processing the state and calculating the block MixCol. Thus, in order to
differentiate both situations an additional processing should be included, which445
produces such difference in the execution time. Finally, the third column of
Table 3 presents the results for one round when the faking countermeasure is
disabled and the plain text is encrypted by the microprocessor (reference sys-
tem). As can be seen, the execution time is almost identical when compared
with the hardware/software implementation, being the main difference due to450
the delay communications created when writing or reading on the FSL bus
(communication between the Microblaze and the coprocessor).
4.2. Comparison with other proposals
A fair comparison of our proposal against previous publications should be
carefully performed. The results, in terms of area and speed, depend strongly on455
the FPGA family used for implementing the system. Thus, the coprocessor was
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Table 3: Execution time of function AddRoundkey, ShiftRows, SubBytes and MixColumns
when solved by Microblaze at 24 MHz and including coprocessor
Function Execution time (µs) Execution time (µs)
(including faking) (without faking)
AddRoundkey 52.76 µs (1266· TCLK) 36.16 µs (940· TCLK)
ShiftRows 4.04 µs (97· TCLK) 4.04 µs (97· TCLK
SubBytes 26.58 µs (638· TCLK) 26.58 µs (638· TCLK)
MixColumns 54.03 µs (1297· TCLK) 43.17 µs (1036· TCLK)
SBoxTrans 4.46 µs (107· TCLK) –
MixCol 54.03 µs (1297· TCLK) –
Remasking 6.04 µs (145· TCLK) –
Execution timefor one round 201.94 µs (4847· TCLK) 112.95 µs (2711· TCLK)
additionally synthetized on a Virtex 4 and a Spartan 6 FPGA. Such FPGAs
were used by those publications in which the comparison performed in this
section is based. On the other hand, almost all such publications are based on
a pure hardware implementation, in contrast to our proposal which is based460
on a hardware-software co-design. Thus, as the coprocessor only performs the
countermeasure to protect the real key, its performance is usually higher.
Table 4 shows such comparison for different protected implementations of
the AES algorithm performed on several FPGAs. As the coprocessor is masked,
only designs protected by masking were included.465
The implementation proposed by Reggazoni et al. [21] is performed on a
Virtex 5. Authors presented two different structures based on a datapath of 32-
bit and 128-bit, respectively.As the MixCol block included in the coprocessor
is based on a 32-bit datapath, results are compared according to this design.
As can be seen, our implementation is carried out in 253 slices, so that only470
the 40% of the logical resources used in that publication are needed for imple-
menting the coprocessor. However, the maximum throughput provided by the
implementation of Reggazoni is higher leading to a better result. Note that,
our coprocessor was designed aiming at minimizing its power consumption per
clock cycle. Such a strategy provides the highest correlation coefficient related475
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Table 4: Comparative study. Previous implementations on different FPGAs.
LUT Flip-Flop Maximum
Proposal (Lookup (Registers) Slices BRAM Fmax Throughput
tables) (MHz) (Mbits/s)
Coprocessor designed (Virtex 5) 516 567 253 2 227 98
Coprocessor designed (Virtex 4) 1233 693 810 4 175 75
Coprocessor designed (Spartan 6) 518 690 303 4 151 65
Reggazoni el at. [21] (Virtex 5) (32-bit datapath) 1429 643 637 – 100 290
Kaumon et at. [17] (Virtex 4) – – 1491 – 143 –
Gu¨neysu et al. [22] (implemented by [23] in Spartan 6) 2888 2351 – 16 147 35
Sasdrich et at. [23] (Spartan 6) 1284 415 – 8 148 68
to the false key, but at the expense of producing a lower throughput.
The protected system proposed by Kaumon et al. [17] is implemented in a
Virtex 4. Only results about slices are presented by the authors.Using the same
FPGA the coprocessor needs about the 54% (810 slices) of the logical resources
used in that publication (1491 slices).480
On the other hand, Gu¨neysu et al. [22] presented the concept of Block
Memory content Scrambling (BMS); a structure based on dual-port BRAM
primitives that offers protection at the cost of increasing the reconfiguration
time for the mask update. When compared with the coprocessor synthetized
on a Spartan 6, the number of LUTs, Flip-Flops and BRAM memories used by485
their design is larger.
The paper presented by Sasdrich et al. [23] shows an alternative implemen-
tation of BMS, but using distributed RAM memory based on Slice-M LUTs
available in modern FPGAs. They reduce by half the resources needed by the
original proposal of Gu¨neysu, and additionally, the throughput is increased by490
two. Our coprocessor, designed in a Spartan 6, could be implemented using less
LUTs (518 against 1284) but more Flip-Flops (690 against 415 FF) than this
improved proposal. Results for the maximum frequency and throughput are
almost identical.
28
5. Conclusions495
A new countermeasure against SCA attacks and its implementation based
on a software/hardware co-design was presented. The effectiveness of such coun-
termeasure relies on revealing a false key, rather than eliminating the statistical
dependence between data and power consumption that is usually performed by
classical approaches. Functions implemented in hardware by the coprocessor500
hardly affect the power consumption, so that their effect on revealing the false
key by means of a correlation attack is unnoticeable. In contrast, as the coun-
termeasure is solved in parallel with the execution of the original algorithm by
the microprocessor, there is no penalty on the execution time. The complete
system was implemented on a Virtex 5 FPGA in order to obtain experimental505
results that corroborated the efficiency of our proposal.
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